Harga Paket Umroh VIP 2016 di Jakarta Hubungi 021-9929-2337 atau 0821-2406-5740 Alhijaz Indowisata adalah perusahaan swasta nasional yang bergerak di bidang tour dan travel. Nama Alhijaz terinspirasi dari istilah dua kota suci bagi umat islam pada zaman nabi Muhammad saw. yaitu Makkah dan Madinah. Dua kota yang penuh berkah sehingga diharapkan menular dalam kinerja perusahaan. Sedangkan Indowisata merupakan akronim dari kata indo yang berarti negara Indonesia dan wisata yang menjadi fokus usaha bisnis kami.

Harga Paket Umroh VIP 2016 di Jakarta Alhijaz Indowisata didirikan oleh Bapak H. Abdullah Djakfar Muksen pada tahun 2010. Merangkak dari kecil namun pasti, alhijaz berkembang pesat dari mulai penjualan tiket maskapai penerbangan domestik dan luar negeri, tour domestik hingga mengembangkan ke layanan jasa umrah dan haji khusus. Tak hanya itu, pada tahun 2011 Alhijaz kembali membuka divisi baru yaitu provider visa umrah yang bekerja sama dengan muassasah arab saudi. Sebagai komitmen legalitas perusahaan dalam melayani pelanggan dan jamaah secara aman dan profesional, saat ini perusahaan telah mengantongi izin resmi dari pemerintah melalui kementrian pariwisata, lalu izin haji khusus dan umrah dari kementrian agama. Selain itu perusahaan juga tergabung dalam komunitas organisasi travel nasional seperti Asita, komunitas penyelenggara umrah dan haji khusus yaitu HIMPUH dan organisasi internasional yaitu IATA.

Harga Paket Umroh VIP 2016 di Jakarta

articinta dan kehidupan   Cínta adalah semangat hídup, tapí terkadang pula cínta tí

 
Cínta adalah semangat hídup, tapí terkadang pula cínta tídak memberíkan artí tapí memberíkan luka. Penyakítku semakín parah, Membuat hídup terasa sebentar.
Cínta adalah semangatku tanpanya aku sepertí hídup dalam kegelapan. Esok harí aku melíhat día begítu menawan, hídungnya yang anggun serasa aku mulaí tak berkedíp hanya butuh waktu untuk dekat denganya.
Darí detík ítulah aku mulaí berjuang demí apa yang aku íngínkan yaítu cínta yang begítu aku kagumí, perjuangan untuk mendapatkannya begítu panjang. Lelah aku menantínya cínta yang sama sekalí kadang tídak jelas. Kesabaran yang aku mílíkí ítulah kuncínya. Waktu terus berjalan sampaí akhírnya cínta yang aku harpkan menjadí kenyataan setelah sekían berbulan-bulan, namun belum cukup sampaí dísítu. Aku berfíkír? Apakah ía kekasíhku atau bukan ntah aku tídak mengertí. Ketíka aku menyatakan perasaanku tídak pernah díbalas olehnya. Dan ketíka aku díam día berkata sayang. Díam hanya bísa membuatku terluka dan bícara padanya membuatku tau ísí hatínya. Namun ucapanku percuma tídak satupun díbalas olehnya.
Harus ku jalaní cínta íní tanpa ada hubungan entah día kekasíhku atau bukan panggílan sayang terdengar darí telínga, Dan terlíhat oleh mata. Waktu masíh berlanjut begítu índah aku rasakan meskí terkadang pertengakaran dan pertíkaían menghadapí hanya satu yaítu jangan pernah egoís yang bísa menyelesaíkannya. 
 
Namun suatu ketíka cínta yang aku percaya untuk salíng menjaga perasaan telah mengecewakanku, día sempat díam-díam mempermaínkan perasaan díbelakangku, ntah mengapa ía lakukan semua ítu. Aku sayang día, begítu sayangnya sama día sampaí aku harus overprotektíf harus pula selalu memberíkan nasehat. 
 
Terkadang ketíka aku kecewa hatíku terluka bíbírku mengucap kata PUTUS namun ítu cuma ucapan, padahal díhatíku tak satupun dan tak pernah ada keíngínan sepertí ítu. Mungkín aku hanya kecewa dan tersakítí dan día tídak pernah merasakan terlukanya hatíku. 
 
Harí bergantí harí masalah aku selesaíkan dengan penuh kesabaran sampaí akhírnya día marah dan terus marah tídak mau mengakuí kesalahanya. Dan akupun masíh tetap sabar, kesabaran membuahkan hasíl perpísahan kembalí menyatu. Ceríta yang tlah aku uraí ceríta yang tlah kíta buat bersama dísítulah masíng masíng darí kíta akan mengenangnya. Mengenang semua ceríta bahagía dan aír mata. Dan kíní kíta mulaí membuka lembaran baru. Aku berharap dí awal ceríta akan bahagía sampaí buku yang kíta buat terus bahagía sampaí akhírnya tetap bersama. 
 

Namun semua ítu percuma satu bulan membuka lembaran baru berbagaí alasan mulaí terucap, aku merasakannya terlalu aneh. Sakít rasanya seseorang yang begítu aku cíntaí terus menyakítíku, kepalaku mulaí sakít darah segar keluar lancar dí hídungku dísaat aku memíkírkannya dan merasakan luka darínya. Ntah aku tak tau tangan bersíh tak sengaja aku usapkan ke hídung darah mengkotorí telapak tanganku, aku semakín sakít ketíka dítambah darah yang mengalír dí otak tersumbat. Día begítu tídak tau apa yang saat ítu aku rasakan, día tídak akan pernah sadar sedíkítpun. Aku cuma berkeíngínan día yang selalu Memberíkanku semangat, memeberíkanku artí hídup meskí harus mencíntaímu sekejap ataukan hídupku masíh panjang aku akan terus menjagamu dan terus mencíntaímu. Tapí día cuma memíkírkan perasaannya demí orang yang ía íngínkan...baca selanjut nya klik di sini

by yandre pramana putra

saco-indonesia.com, Dirusaknya Satlantas di Jalan Trunojoyo dan Bundaran Senayan, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan (Jaksel) oleh

saco-indonesia.com, Dirusaknya Satlantas di Jalan Trunojoyo dan Bundaran Senayan, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan (Jaksel) oleh sekelompok orang yang tak dikenal, telah membuktikan bahwa wibawa polisi merosot di titik terendah.

"Memang (wibawa polisi tengah merosot) yang telah menjaga pos kepolisian itu kan polisi dan itu simbol kenegaraan. Memang tren pos polisi di serang marak, lantaran penindakannya yang tidak tuntas," kata pengamat kepolisian Bambang Widodo Umar, Senin (10/2/2014).

Dia juga memprediksi, jika Polri tak mengungkap kasus ini hingga ke akarnya, maka bukan mustahil peristiwa serupa akan dapat terulang. "Saya harap ini kejadian yang terakhir. Jadi polri juga harus mencari sekuat mungkin siapa pelakunya dan menindak tegas, hukum seberat-beratnya,"singkatnya.

Polisi juga akan terus mengusut kasus kasus perusakan terhadap dua Pos Pol Satlantas di Jakarta Selatan (Jaksel). Saat ini telah ada lima saksi yang diperiksa, yaitu Sumiati (18), Topan Saputra (17), Juleha (20), Tari (18), Taunah (66).

Kepala Bidang Humas Polda Metro Jaya, Kombes Pol Rikwanto juga menuturkan, pelaku perusakan dua Pos Pol Satlantas telah memiliki ciri-ciri berambut cepak.

Kejadian bermula dari perempatan Kuningan pukul 22.30 malam WIB, saat anggota lantas telah menghentikan arus lalin karena akan lewat rombongan Wapres. Kemudian ada pengendara sepeda motor berambut cepak berboncengan nyelonong kemudian dihentikan anggota lantas (lalu-lintas).

Setelah dijelaskan kemudian yang bonceng turun memukul anggota lantas hingga jatuh. Rekan anggota lantas lainnya yang tidak jauh dari lokasi mendatangi pembonceng tersebut untuk melerai.

Malah dipukul di wajah kemudian dibalas dan saling akhirnya saling pukul. Saat itu juga anggota lantas yang pertama berkelahi dengan yang mengendarai motor. Kondisi seperti itu Danton Lantas Ipda Kardi datang melerai dan membubarkan.

Dijelaskannya, sang pengendara motor tersebut juga sempat mengutarakan kecaman kepada anggota lantas. "Saat itu pembonceng mengatakan Awas kamu! Saya tidak terima, tunggu saya, saya akan datang dengan pasukan," papar Rikwanto.


Editor : Dian Sukmawati

Mr. Alger, who served five terms from Texas, led Republican women in a confrontation with Lyndon B. Johnson that may have cost Richard M. Nixon the 1960 presidential election.

WASHINGTON — The former deputy director of the C.I.A. asserts in a forthcoming book that Republicans, in their eagerness to politicize the killing of the American ambassador to Libya, repeatedly distorted the agency’s analysis of events. But he also argues that the C.I.A. should get out of the business of providing “talking points” for administration officials in national security events that quickly become partisan, as happened after the Benghazi attack in 2012.

The official, Michael J. Morell, dismisses the allegation that the United States military and C.I.A. officers “were ordered to stand down and not come to the rescue of their comrades,” and he says there is “no evidence” to support the charge that “there was a conspiracy between C.I.A. and the White House to spin the Benghazi story in a way that would protect the political interests of the president and Secretary Clinton,” referring to the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

But he also concludes that the White House itself embellished some of the talking points provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had blocked him from sending an internal study of agency conclusions to Congress.

Photo
 
Michael J. Morell Credit Mark Wilson/Getty Images

“I finally did so without asking,” just before leaving government, he writes, and after the White House released internal emails to a committee investigating the State Department’s handling of the issue.

A lengthy congressional investigation remains underway, one that many Republicans hope to use against Mrs. Clinton in the 2016 election cycle.

In parts of the book, “The Great War of Our Time” (Twelve), Mr. Morell praises his C.I.A. colleagues for many successes in stopping terrorist attacks, but he is surprisingly critical of other C.I.A. failings — and those of the National Security Agency.

Soon after Mr. Morell retired in 2013 after 33 years in the agency, President Obama appointed him to a commission reviewing the actions of the National Security Agency after the disclosures of Edward J. Snowden, a former intelligence contractor who released classified documents about the government’s eavesdropping abilities. Mr. Morell writes that he was surprised by what he found.

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“You would have thought that of all the government entities on the planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been the N.S.A.,” he writes. “But it turned out that the N.S.A. had left itself vulnerable.”

He concludes that most Wall Street firms had better cybersecurity than the N.S.A. had when Mr. Snowden swept information from its systems in 2013. While he said he found himself “chagrined by how well the N.S.A. was doing” compared with the C.I.A. in stepping up its collection of data on intelligence targets, he also sensed that the N.S.A., which specializes in electronic spying, was operating without considering the implications of its methods.

“The N.S.A. had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should,” he says.

The book is to be released next week.

Mr. Morell was a career analyst who rose through the ranks of the agency, and he ended up in the No. 2 post. He served as President George W. Bush’s personal intelligence briefer in the first months of his presidency — in those days, he could often be spotted at the Starbucks in Waco, Tex., catching up on his reading — and was with him in the schoolhouse in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, when the Bush presidency changed in an instant.

Mr. Morell twice took over as acting C.I.A. director, first when Leon E. Panetta was appointed secretary of defense and then when retired Gen. David H. Petraeus resigned over an extramarital affair with his biographer, a relationship that included his handing her classified notes of his time as America’s best-known military commander.

Mr. Morell says he first learned of the affair from Mr. Petraeus only the night before he resigned, and just as the Benghazi events were turning into a political firestorm. While praising Mr. Petraeus, who had told his deputy “I am very lucky” to run the C.I.A., Mr. Morell writes that “the organization did not feel the same way about him.” The former general “created the impression through the tone of his voice and his body language that he did not want people to disagree with him (which was not true in my own interaction with him),” he says.

But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.

The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.

But he concludes that the assault in which the ambassador was killed took place “with little or no advance planning” and “was not well organized.” He says the attackers “did not appear to be looking for Americans to harm. They appeared intent on looting and conducting some vandalism,” setting fires that killed Mr. Stevens and a security official, Sean Smith.

Mr. Morell paints a picture of an agency that was struggling, largely unsuccessfully, to understand dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2011 in Tunisia. The agency’s analysts failed to see the forces of revolution coming — and then failed again, he writes, when they told Mr. Obama that the uprisings would undercut Al Qaeda by showing there was a democratic pathway to change.

“There is no good explanation for our not being able to see the pressures growing to dangerous levels across the region,” he writes. The agency had again relied too heavily “on a handful of strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab street,” he says, and those leaders themselves were clueless.

Moreover, an agency that has always overvalued secretly gathered intelligence and undervalued “open source” material “was not doing enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media,” he writes. “We thought and told policy makers that this outburst of popular revolt would damage Al Qaeda by undermining the group’s narrative,” he writes.

Instead, weak governments in Egypt, and the absence of governance from Libya to Yemen, were “a boon to Islamic extremists across both the Middle East and North Africa.”

Mr. Morell is gentle about most of the politicians he dealt with — he expresses admiration for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, though he accuses former Vice President Dick Cheney of deliberately implying a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq that the C.I.A. had concluded probably did not exist. But when it comes to the events leading up to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, he is critical of his own agency.

Mr. Morell concludes that the Bush White House did not have to twist intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s alleged effort to rekindle the country’s work on weapons of mass destruction.

“The view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on W.M.D. is just flat wrong,” he writes. “No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years, long before Bush came to office.”

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